I. Introduction
At the outset, we want to commend the Committee for initiating this process to review and update the current Communications Act. In our opinion, the review is timely because the Communications Act does need updating. And we commend the deliberative and open nature of the review process as it begins.
At the time the review process was announced, Chairman Walden stated: "When the Communications Act was updated almost 18 years ago, no one could have dreamed of the many innovations and advancements that make the Internet what it is today.
Written during the Great Depression and last updated when 56 kilobits per second via dial-up modem was state of the art, the Communications Act is now painfully out of * While the signatories to this Response are in general agreement, of course, with the views expressed in these comments, their participation as signatories should not necessarily be taken as agreement on every aspect of the submission. And the views expressed are those of the individuals, and they should not be attributed to the institutions with which they are identified.
date." 1 In the first White Paper, "Modernizing the Communications Act," 2 the Committee explains the initiation of the updating process this way: "Changes in technology and the rate at which they are occurring warrant an examination of whether, and how, communications law can be rationalized to address the 21 st century communications landscape." Regardless of precisely how this proposition is framed, and we do not intend to belabor the matter, the essential point is this: Since the Communications Act was last revised in any meaningful way in 1996, the communications and information services marketplace environment, driven in significant part by technological changes, has changed dramatically. Thus, in our view, the review and updating process not only is timely but necessary.
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The Committee has adopted a wise approach by initially seeking responses to questions that, as the White Paper puts it, "address thematic concepts" for updating the Communications Act. It is certainly preferable to begin the review and public comment process by eliciting responses at this higher thematic level, and then, as the process 1 "Upton and Walden Announce Plans to Update the Communications Act," News Release, Committee on Energy and Commerce, December 3, 2013. 2 White Paper No. 1, "Modernizing the Communications Act," January 8, 2014.
3 While we certainly hope that the review and updating process proceeds apace in light of the dramatic technological and marketplace changes that already have occurred, we understand that it may be several years before the end of the road is reached. In the interim, Congress should not necessarily refrain from adopting certain targeted revisions that may improve communications policy and which are consistent with the overall market-oriented reform direction that communications policy should take. Examples of such targeted measures that might be appropriate include two bills introduced last year by Rep. Bob Latta, Communications and Technology Subcommittee Vice-Chair: H.R. 2649, the "FCC 'ABCs' Act of 2013," which would revise the forbearance provision in Section 10 of the Communications Act to require clear and convincing evidence that the forbearance requirements are not met before denying relief, and H.R. 3196, the Consumer Choice in Video Devices Act, which would revise Section 629 of the Act to require elimination of the cable television set-top box integration ban imposed by the FCC.
progressively moves forward, the Committee will be in a better position to seek responses to questions at less thematic, more specific, levels of detail.
The questions asked in the first White Paper are the proper ones. Given the nature of the current statute, and the direction that changes in the statute likely should take, it is not surprising that, at least from our perspective, the questions would elicit responses with considerable overlap and duplication if each is answered separately and in serial fashion. Therefore, we prefer, in order to avoid undue repetition and duplication, to provide a narrative that, in essence, takes the second question: "What should a modern Communications Act look like?" as the primary focal point of our response. In answering this broad framing question posed by the White Paper, we necessarily will address the other questions relating to the structure of the Act, the need for flexibility and technological neutrality, the distinction between information and telecommunications services, and so forth.
II. The Major Guiding Principles for Reforming the Communications Act
In this section, before providing a more expansive narrative statement responsive to the Committee's questions, we want to set forth in summary fashion what we believe should be the guiding foundational principles of the reform effort. These principles will guide the narrative statement that follows this Section II.
A. In updating the Communications Act, a clean slate approach is needed to adopt a "replacement" regime -a new Digital Age Communications Act, if you will 4 -because the new act should be much different in concept and structure than the existing one. B. Generally, the broad delegation of indeterminate authority to the FCC to regulate "in the public interest" should be replaced with a marketplace competition-based standard, so that, except in limited circumstances, the FCC's regulatory activities will be required to be tied to findings of consumer harm resulting from lack of sufficient competition. 
III. "What Should a Modern Communications Act Look Like?"
As stated above, within the context of answering this broad framing question we believe we will answer below all of the questions posed by the Committee. But because we understand that this is just the beginning of the process, a process that certainly will focus more narrowly on specific subject matters and issues as it continues, our response, by design, is broadly thematic in keeping with the nature of the initial set of questions.
A. A Clean Slate for Adopting a Replacement Regime
Perhaps the most fundamental question the Committee will face is whether
Congress should approach the updating process by, for the most part, starting with a "clean slate" to devise a replacement regime, or whether, on the other hand, it could achieve what needs to be accomplished in an update by employing more targeted revisions to the current statute. There may well be some who suggest that rather replacing the current act with a new one embodying a very different model, a principal drafting objective should be to amend the statute as little as possible. We do not discount the possibility that the existing Communications Act could be improved, perhaps even substantially, by amendments to the current statute. 5 But the option of "tinkering around the edges" in order in an effort to minimize the changes to the current statute should be rejected in favor of adopting a replacement statue.
There are two primary reasons for this. First, as explained below, the conceptual changes in communications law and policy that are warranted, indeed required, by the dramatic technological and marketplace changes described in the Committee's White
Paper, are major. The governing concepts and philosophical principles embodied in the new act that we envision are very different from the governing concepts and philosophical principles embodied in the current statute. After all, in many important respects, in a foundational sense, the current statute remains intact as adopted in 1934, and the 1934 Act itself closely resembled, in significant respects, the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887. The ICA's very purpose was to tame what were considered to be static carriers exercising monopolistic power, not to oversee a technologically dynamic marketplace. This being so, the "clean slate" approach simply makes more sense.
Second, and relatedly, the clean slate approach is more susceptible to achieving the goal of simplicity. A clean slate approach adopting a replacement regime is much more likely to result in a governing statute that is shorter, better organized, more intelligible, with fewer unintended conflicts, than one that takes the current act as its starting point.
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B. The Silos Should Be Eliminated
As the Committee's first question states: "The current Communications Act is structured around particular services." No one really disputes this assertion, and there is fairly widespread agreement that the current act's structure, with its various regulatory 6 It is worth noting here that we understand that there will need to be attention paid to transitional periods and transitional mechanisms to get from the existing statute to a new one. These transitional issues, which may involve phase-outs of certain obligations and duties over a period of time, will present some difficult and important questions. Nevertheless, at bottom, they are still transitional issues. It would be a mistake to sacrifice the benefits of long-term improvements in the law because of a fear of short-term disruption.
"silos" or "stovepipes" is increasingly problematic in the digital age. Under the existing statute, disparate regulations often apply to services that, from the consumer's perspective, compete against each other in the marketplace. Thus, for example, "telecommunications" providers are regulated differently from "information services"
providers. "Cable " television operators are regulated differently from broadcasters and "satellite" television operators. Wireless service providers are subject to their own set of regulatory requirements, even though the services they offer increasingly compete with all of the others.
Without belaboring the point, whatever the merits of the "silo" structure in an earlier age, it no longer makes sense. The various silos, in essence, primarily are based on "techno-functional" constructs 7 that do not comport with the realities of digital age technologies and services. Even a casual examination of the definitions of "telecommunications," "information services," "cable service," "mobile service," and so forth shows that these definitions, with the attendant regulatory classification impacts, mostly are tied to descriptions of certain technological capabilities or functional characteristics of the services.
The old saw that a "byte is a byte is a byte" is now a digital world truism, at least in the sense that is relevant here. And it is this technological reality that has rendered the understand its reluctance to conclude that these IP-based voice services are "telecommunications" with all the attendant regulatory consequences that may flow from such a determination. Nevertheless, it is the consequences of this non-action -at best, continued regulatory uncertainty, or, at worst, the application of disparate regulations to services that, from the consumer's perspective, compete against each other in the marketplace -that demonstrate the need to dismantle the silo regime, including the distinction between "telecommunications service" on the one hand and "information services" on the other.
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The transition from narrowband to broadband and from analog to digital has rendered the silo regime statutory structure obsolete. In the current environment, the communications marketplace has become increasingly competitive -but the competition primarily takes place across multiple digital broadband platforms employing various technologies, and sometimes a mix of technologies. These various communications platforms should not be subject to disparate regulations simply because they are consigned to one silo or another. Instead, a new act should be technologically neutral.
The current approach creates incentives for companies to invest capital in efforts to gain advantages through regulatory arbitrage, rather than investing in ways to deliver better services to consumers more efficiently.
C. The Public Interest Standard Should Be Largely Eliminated
Aside from the silo structure, there is another paradigm in the Communications Act that, for the most part, 12 should be jettisoned in a new Digital Age Communications Act. This is the ubiquitous "public interest" standard, which "still pervades the current regulatory regime." 13 There are nearly 100 different provisions in the Communications Act which delegate authority to the FCC to regulate in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" (or some very close variant thereof). 14 There is an argument that the public interest standard, which originated in Progressive/New Deal era theories of public administration based on notions of an agency's presumed impartial, nonpolitical expertise, is so indeterminate in meaning that it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 15 Among long-time FCC-watchers, there is an old saw that the "public interest" is whatever three of the five commissioners say it is on any given day.
While the Supreme Court has rejected the constitutional challenge to the public interest 12 We say "for the most part" because there may be a few limited instances in which retention of the public interest standard might be appropriate. It is not the proper place here, at the beginning of the review process, to attempt to delineate those places, if any. 190, 219-226 (1943) . 17 In our view, the Commission generally should retain jurisdiction over electronic communications networks and services that, to a significant extent, mirrors the extent of the agency's jurisdiction under the current Communications Act. Thus, while the language would be updated to reflect modern usage, we envision that the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction would not be materially narrowed from the scope of the agency's jurisdiction in present Section 2(a) of the Act. We hasten to add, though, as explained in the text, that the exercise of whatever jurisdiction the Commisison is granted should be substantially constrained by the new competition-based standard that ties the exercise of the Commission's authoritiy to findings of market failure and consumer harm. In other words, it is important to distinguish between the conferral of jurisdiction and the real constraints placed on the exercise of such jurisdiction. Finally, there are delegations of authority in the curent act, such as the enforcement of privacy (CPNI) rules for telephone and cable companies, that probably should be transferred to the Federal Trade Commission so that various entities providing comparable services in the Internet ecosystem would be subject to the same type of regulations. And enforcing a uniform set of privacy rules, and other consumer protection-like rules, for example, is closer to the core competency of the FTC than the FCC.
Commission generally should be required to find a threat of an abuse of market power and a concomitant threat of consumer harm before imposing regulations on entities subject to its jurisdiction. 18 In line with the recommendation of the Digital Age
Communications Act Regulatory Framework Working Group, and the technological dynamism that characterizes the communications marketplace, it may be advisable for the new statute to specify that any market failure found by the Commission must be determined to be "non-transitory."
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By virtue of adoption of a competition standard grounded in antitrust-like jurisprudential principles, before regulating the FCC would be required, much more than it is today under the existing act, to engage in a rigorous economic analysis that focuses on actual and potential marketplace competition. As part of such analysis, the agency necessarily would need to take into account the impact of the dynamism that characterizes the digital marketplace.
Recognizing the importance of the interconnection of communications networks that serve the public, the FCC should have authority to maintain interconnection by addressing interconnection practices that might pose significant consumer harm, where it finds that marketplace competition is not adequately protecting consumers. This standard also recognizes the importance of competition analysis, but also empowers the FCC to maintain the most central aspect of the modern Internet -its interconnected nature.
E. Curtailing Ex Ante Rulemakings and Relying More Heavily on Ex Post
Adjudication of Complaints
In a new act, the FCC should be required to favor narrowly-tailored ex post remedial orders in addressing practices that are alleged to be anticompetitive or abusive rather than undertaking broad ex ante proscriptions developed in generic rulemakings.
The agency generally should be required to determine whether service providers subject to individualized complaints have adopted practices that present the threat of abuse of significant and non-transitory market power that should be constrained in some 
IV. The Structure and Jurisdiction of the FCC
The Committee asks, quite appropriately, about the structure and jurisdiction of the FCC, and how they should be tailored to address the systematic change in communications. To a significant extent, of course, the structure of the agency, in an institutional sense, should be strongly influenced by -or "follow" as in the saying, "form follows function" -the jurisdiction of the agency and the structure of the new act that defines the agency's exercise of its regulatory authority. In five years, we expect U.S communications markets to be characterized predominately by vigorous competition that will greatly reduce the need for direct regulation. The advent of Internet-based and other new technology-driven communications services will continue to erode the traditional regulatory distinctions between different sectors of the communications industry. As a result, over the next five years, the FCC must wisely manage the transition from an industry regulator to a market facilitator. The FCC as we know it today will be very different in both structure and mission. With respect to the FCC's jurisdiction, as lines continue to blur across the Internet ecosystem among various providers of services that, from the consumer's perspective, are comparable -regardless whether they are facilities-based network service providers, "over-the-top" providers of VoIP services, or content and applications "edge" providers, or whatever -it will be important in drafting a new act to consider treating such services in a holistic way, at least for some purposes that relate more closely to consumer protection than to traditional economic regulation. For example, with regard to any regulatory oversight relative to the protection of privacy or data security, even though the FCC presently has some jurisdiction in these areas, for the most part, it would be preferable to consolidate such jurisdiction in the FTC. The types of consumer protection issues most likely to arise with regard to privacy and data security are at the core of the FTC's institutional expertise. If jurisdiction over these type of matters -matters outside of the purview of traditional economic regulation of service providers -is transferred to the FTC, it is much less likely that telecom and cable services providers, on the one hand, and, say, Facebook or Twitter, on the other, will end up subject to disparate regulations in these areas. over siting decisions, because they know best how specific projects will affect a local community. Similarly, state regulators are in a better position to understand the individualized needs of local communities and thus should retain a prominent voice regarding consumer protection issues, though subject to federal oversight to assure that parochial issues do not needlessly jeopardize broader national objectives.
